AML Compliance Guide
for Real Estate Agents

1. Why Real Estate Agents Are Now Under AML/CTF Regulation

Real estate has long been identified by international anti-money-laundering bodies as one of the most significant vectors for laundering the proceeds of crime. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global standard-setter for AML/CTF regulation, has repeatedly highlighted real estate transactions as a preferred mechanism for criminals to integrate illicit funds into the legitimate economy. In its mutual evaluation reports on Australia, the FATF specifically noted the absence of AML/CTF coverage for real estate agents as a material gap in Australia's regulatory framework.

The scale of the vulnerability is substantial. According to AUSTRAC estimates, hundreds of billions of dollars flow through Australian property markets annually, and the opaque nature of many property transactions — combined with the use of trusts, companies, and nominee arrangements — creates fertile ground for money laundering. Property is attractive to criminals because it is a high-value asset class that typically appreciates over time, can be purchased through complex legal structures, and can be readily converted back to cash through sale or refinancing.

Australia addressed this gap in October 2024 with the passage of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2024, commonly referred to as Tranche 2. This legislation extends the existing AML/CTF Act 2006 to cover a range of professional service providers — including real estate agents, accountants, lawyers, and conveyancers — who were previously exempt from Australia's anti-money-laundering regime. The reforms bring Australia into alignment with FATF Recommendations 22 and 23, which require countries to subject designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) to AML/CTF obligations.

For real estate agents, this is not merely a technical regulatory change. It introduces an entirely new compliance framework that affects how you onboard clients, manage trust accounts, conduct property transactions, and interact with vendors and purchasers. From 1 July 2026, every real estate agency that provides a designated service must have a functioning AML/CTF program, conduct customer due diligence, report suspicious matters to AUSTRAC, and maintain records for a minimum of seven years. AUSTRAC enrolment opens on 31 March 2026.

The estimated impact on the industry is significant. There are approximately 45,000 licensed real estate agents and agencies across Australia. Each will need to assess whether their activities constitute designated services, develop or adopt an AML/CTF program, train staff, and implement new operational procedures — all before the commencement date. For a more comprehensive overview of Tranche 2 across all affected professions, see our AUSTRAC Tranche 2 Explained guide.

2. Which Real Estate Services Are Designated Services?

Under the amended AML/CTF Act 2006, real estate agents become "reporting entities" when they provide designated services as defined in s6AA. The concept of designated services is central to understanding when your obligations are triggered. Not every activity a real estate agent undertakes will fall within scope — only those specifically listed in the legislation.

The designated services relevant to real estate agents include:

• Acting as an intermediary in the sale or purchase of real property — This covers the core activity of real estate agents: representing a vendor or purchaser in the sale or purchase of real property, whether residential, commercial, rural, or industrial. If you are engaged to act on behalf of a party to a property transaction, you are providing a designated service.
• Conducting auctions — Where you act as an auctioneer or conduct auction services on behalf of a vendor, this constitutes a designated service under s6AA. The auction itself is the provision of the service, and CDD obligations attach at the point you are engaged to conduct the auction.
• Property management involving financial transactions — Where property management activities involve the handling of financial transactions on behalf of clients (such as collecting rent, managing bond deposits, or disbursing funds), these may constitute designated services. The key determinant is whether you are handling client money in connection with a property arrangement.
• Managing client money — Any activity where a real estate agent receives, holds, or disburses money on behalf of a client in connection with a property transaction is within scope. This includes holding deposits in trust accounts pending settlement, managing rental income, and disbursing settlement proceeds.
• Leasing services — Facilitating lease transactions where the arrangement involves financial intermediation, such as collecting lease deposits, managing rental bonds, or handling lease payments on behalf of landlords.

What Is Excluded?

Certain activities performed by real estate agents are unlikely to constitute designated services. These include purely advisory or marketing services where you do not act as an intermediary in a transaction, property valuations conducted independently of a sale transaction, and administrative services that do not involve the handling of client funds or acting on behalf of a party to a property transaction. However, agents should exercise caution: where an advisory engagement evolves into an intermediary role, the designated service trigger may apply. The critical point is that your AML/CTF obligations attach at the point you agree to provide a designated service to a client.

3. Money Laundering Typologies in Real Estate

Understanding how criminals use real estate to launder money is essential for recognising suspicious activity in your practice. The FATF and AUSTRAC have identified numerous typologies specific to the property sector. Real estate is attractive to money launderers because property transactions are high-value, the market is relatively opaque compared to financial markets, and there are legitimate reasons for complex ownership structures — making it harder to distinguish lawful complexity from criminal obfuscation.

Purchasing Property with Proceeds of Crime

The most direct typology involves using criminal proceeds to purchase property outright. The property acts as a store of value, converting illicit cash into a legitimate asset. The criminal may live in the property, rent it out for ongoing income, or hold it for capital appreciation. This is the "placement" stage of money laundering — the initial entry of criminal funds into the legitimate financial system. Agents should be alert to buyers who appear to have access to significant cash or funds that are inconsistent with their declared employment, occupation, or business activities.

Price Manipulation: Over-Valuation and Under-Valuation

Deliberately purchasing a property above or below its true market value is a common laundering technique. In an over-valuation scenario, a buyer pays more than the property is worth, with the excess amount representing illicit funds that are "cleaned" through the settlement process. In an under-valuation scenario, a property is acquired below market value with the balance paid "off the books" in cash or through an undisclosed side arrangement. Both approaches distort the paper trail and create an apparent legitimate source for the funds. Agents should be wary of transactions where the agreed price is materially different from comparable sales or independent valuations.

Use of Nominees and Shell Companies

Purchasing property through nominee buyers, shelf companies, or layered corporate structures is a well-established method for obscuring the true beneficial owner of a property. In Australia, the use of companies and trusts for property ownership is common and legitimate, particularly for tax and asset-protection purposes. However, the same structures can be exploited to hide the source and ownership of funds. A particular red flag is a purchasing entity that has been recently incorporated, has no trading history, has nominee directors in a different jurisdiction, or has a corporate chain that terminates in a jurisdiction with weak beneficial ownership transparency.

Rapid Flipping

Buying and selling the same property within a short timeframe — sometimes referred to as "rapid flipping" — can be used to layer illicit funds. Each transaction further distances the funds from their criminal origin, making the trail harder to follow. While legitimate property developers and renovators do buy and resell quickly, the absence of any genuine improvement, development, or change in circumstances should raise questions. Agents should query situations where a vendor acquired a property very recently and is reselling it at a significant markup without any apparent renovation, development approval, or market-driven reason for the price increase.

Use of Trusts and Self-Managed Super Funds

Discretionary trusts, unit trusts, and self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) are commonly used to hold property in Australia. While these structures serve legitimate purposes, they can be exploited to conceal beneficial ownership and the origin of funds. A discretionary trust, for example, can have broadly defined classes of beneficiaries, making it difficult to identify who truly benefits from the property holding. Agents should seek to understand the purpose and structure of any trust or SMSF purchasing property and identify all relevant parties (trustees, settlors, appointors, and significant beneficiaries).

Foreign Buyers as a Layering Mechanism

International fund flows into Australian property can be used as a layering mechanism, where illicit funds are moved across borders before being used to acquire property. The distance between the source of funds and the Australian transaction can make it extremely difficult to trace the origin of the money. Multi-jurisdictional ownership chains — for example, a buyer structured as a company registered in one jurisdiction, owned by a trust settled in a second jurisdiction, with a bank account in a third — are a particular area of concern. Agents should treat any transaction involving complex cross-border structures with heightened scrutiny.

Third-Party Funding and Unexplained Intermediaries

Where a deposit or purchase price is funded by a third party who is not a party to the transaction, this is a significant red flag. Legitimate explanations exist — a parent providing a deposit for a child, for example — but unexplained third-party funding, particularly from entities or individuals with no obvious connection to the buyer, may indicate that the true source of the funds is being concealed. Agents should inquire about the relationship between any third-party funder and the buyer, and document the explanation.

Renovation-and-Flip Schemes

A variation on rapid flipping involves purchasing a property cheaply, claiming to renovate it (using cash labour or inflated invoices from complicit contractors), and then selling at a significantly higher price. The claimed renovation costs provide a veneer of legitimacy for the price increase. The actual renovation work may be minimal or non-existent, but the inflated invoices create a paper trail suggesting legitimate expenditure. Agents should compare the extent of visible improvements with the claimed renovation spend when listing a property that has been recently acquired and is being resold at a substantial premium.

4. Building Your AML/CTF Program

Part 7A of the AML/CTF Act 2006 requires every reporting entity to develop and maintain an AML/CTF program. This is the foundational compliance document for your agency. It must be written, it must be tailored to the specific ML/TF risks your agency faces, and it must be implemented before you provide designated services from 1 July 2026. The AML/CTF Rules 2024 prescribe the detailed requirements for each component of the program.

An AML/CTF program consists of two mandatory parts:

Part A: Systems and Controls

Part A must address the following areas, tailored to your real estate agency:

• ML/TF risk assessment — A documented assessment of the money laundering and terrorism financing risks relevant to your agency. This should consider the types of clients you serve, the geographic areas you operate in, the property types you deal with, and your delivery channels (in-person, online, through third-party agents). See Section 9 below for detailed guidance on risk assessment.
• Customer due diligence procedures — Clear processes for identifying and verifying clients before providing designated services, in accordance with s28–35 of the Act. This includes standard CDD, enhanced CDD for higher-risk clients, and simplified CDD where appropriate.
• Ongoing customer due diligence — Procedures for monitoring the business relationship over time and updating client information as circumstances change, particularly for long-term property management engagements.
• Transaction monitoring — Systems for detecting unusual or suspicious transactions, including trust account monitoring (see Section 7).
• Suspicious matter reporting procedures — Internal processes for escalating and reporting suspicious matters to AUSTRAC in accordance with s41–49 (see Section 8).
• Record keeping — Procedures for maintaining all records required under Part 10 of the Act for a minimum of seven years (see Section 10).
• AML/CTF compliance officer — Designation of a compliance officer responsible for the program. In small agencies, this is often the principal or licensee.

Part B: Employee Due Diligence

Part B requires the following, adapted for real estate agency operations:

• Employee screening — Background checks on employees, agents, and contractors who are involved in providing designated services or who have access to compliance-sensitive functions such as trust account management or client identification records. The level of screening should be proportionate to the role.
• Ongoing employee due diligence — Procedures for monitoring employees for changes in circumstances that might increase ML/TF risk, such as an agent who becomes subject to bankruptcy proceedings, disciplinary action by a licensing authority, or criminal charges.
• AML/CTF training — All staff involved in providing designated services must receive training on your AML/CTF obligations. Training must be provided at induction and refreshed at least annually. Training content should cover the ML/TF typologies in Section 3, CDD procedures, the SMR process, the tipping-off prohibition under s123, and your agency's internal escalation procedures.

5. Customer Due Diligence for Property Transactions

Customer due diligence (CDD) is at the heart of your AML/CTF obligations. Sections 28 to 35 of the AML/CTF Act 2006 set out the CDD framework. The core principle is straightforward: you must identify and verify the identity of your client before you provide a designated service. For a detailed guide to CDD procedures under the Act, see our Customer Due Diligence Guide.

CDD for Buyers

When you act on behalf of a buyer or accept an offer from a buyer on behalf of a vendor, you must conduct CDD on the buyer. For individual buyers, this means collecting full name, date of birth, and residential address, and verifying that information against reliable, independent sources. Acceptable verification methods under the AML/CTF Rules 2024 include:

• Government-issued photo identification (Australian passport, driver's licence, or proof of age card) verified through the Document Verification Service (DVS) or by sighting the original document
• Electronic identity verification (eIDV) using an accredited provider that matches the individual's details against multiple reliable data sources

Where the buyer is a company, you must collect the company name, ABN/ACN, registered office address, and the names of directors. Verify the entity's existence and details through a current ASIC extract. Where the buyer is a trust, you must obtain the trust deed and identify the trustees, settlors, appointors, and beneficiaries (or classes of beneficiaries for discretionary trusts).

CDD for Sellers

When you are engaged by a vendor to list and sell a property, the vendor is your client and CDD must be conducted on them. The same identification and verification requirements apply. You should complete CDD before signing the listing agreement or agency authority. In practice, this means collecting and verifying the vendor's identity as part of the listing process — not after the property is already on the market.

Beneficial Ownership

When a client is purchasing or selling through a company, trust, or other legal arrangement, you must identify the beneficial owner — the natural person who ultimately owns or controls the entity. Under the AML/CTF Rules, you must take reasonable steps to identify any individual who holds a 25% or greater ownership interest in the entity, or who otherwise exercises effective control (for example, as an appointor of a discretionary trust or a director with disproportionate influence). Where ownership is held through multiple layers (e.g., a company owned by another company owned by a trust), you must trace the chain to identify the natural persons at the top of the structure.

When to Perform CDD

CDD must be completed before you provide the designated service. In practical terms:

• For sellers: Before you sign the listing agreement or agency authority
• For buyers: Before you submit an offer on their behalf or accept a deposit into your trust account
• For property management: Before you enter into a management agreement that involves handling client funds
• For auctions: Before you accept a bid or receive a deposit from the winning bidder

If you cannot satisfactorily complete CDD, you must not provide the designated service. This is a firm requirement under the Act. You may also need to consider whether the inability to complete CDD itself gives rise to a suspicion that should be reported.

Enhanced Customer Due Diligence (ECDD)

In certain higher-risk situations, standard CDD is not sufficient. Enhanced CDD is required when:

• The client is a politically exposed person (PEP) or a close associate or family member of a PEP
• The transaction involves a high-risk jurisdiction identified by the FATF
• The client presents with complex ownership structures that have no clear commercial rationale
• There are unusually large cash components in the transaction
• The transaction is inconsistent with the client's known profile — for example, a modest-income buyer purchasing a high-value property

ECDD measures include obtaining additional identification documentation, verifying the source of funds and source of wealth, conducting more extensive beneficial ownership inquiries, obtaining senior management approval before proceeding, and increasing the frequency of ongoing monitoring.

6. Foreign Buyer Identification and FIRB Overlay

Foreign buyers present elevated ML/TF risk in Australian real estate transactions. This is because verifying identity and source of funds across borders is inherently more difficult, and international fund flows may be used to layer illicit proceeds through multiple jurisdictions before they arrive in Australia.

FIRB Interaction

Foreign buyers of Australian real estate are generally required to obtain approval from the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975. While FIRB approval and AML/CTF compliance are separate legal requirements with separate regulators, the information collected for FIRB purposes can usefully inform your CDD process. However, FIRB approval does not discharge your AML/CTF obligations — you must independently satisfy yourself as to the client's identity and the legitimacy of the transaction. Conversely, the absence of required FIRB approval may itself be an indicator of non-compliance or deception.

Additional CDD for Foreign Buyers

For foreign buyers, your CDD procedures should include:

• A valid foreign passport or national identity document
• Verification of the foreign entity's registration in its home jurisdiction through an official company registry extract or equivalent
• Identification of all beneficial owners of foreign corporate structures, traced through to the natural persons at the top of the ownership chain
• Evidence of FIRB approval where applicable
• Electronic identity verification where available for the relevant jurisdiction, or documentary verification where eIDV is not available

Source of Funds Checks

Given the elevated risk profile associated with foreign buyers, source of funds inquiries are critical. You should seek to understand:

• How the purchase is being financed (overseas savings, loan from an Australian bank, loan from a foreign bank, inheritance, business profits)
• Whether the funding source is consistent with the client's declared occupation, business activities, and financial profile
• The route of international wire transfers — funds should be traceable to an originating institution in the buyer's home jurisdiction or a jurisdiction with a transparent banking system

Higher Risk Indicators for Foreign Buyers

The following factors elevate the risk profile of a foreign buyer transaction:

• The buyer is based in, or the funds originate from, a jurisdiction on the FATF grey list or high-risk list
• Multi-jurisdictional ownership chains with no clear commercial rationale
• Reluctance to provide source of funds information or documentary evidence of the funding source
• Funds arriving from multiple different jurisdictions or accounts
• The buyer has no apparent connection to Australia (no family, business, or immigration ties) and no intention to occupy the property
• Use of a local nominee or proxy to manage the transaction

7. Trust Account Monitoring

Real estate agents routinely hold client funds in trust accounts — deposits on property sales, rental income, bond monies, and settlement adjustments. Under the AML/CTF framework, trust accounts become a critical compliance touchpoint because they involve the handling of client money in connection with designated services.

Deposit Management

When receiving a deposit into your trust account, you should record the source of the deposit (electronic funds transfer, bank cheque, personal cheque, or cash), the originating bank account or institution, and the identity of the person who made the deposit. Where the deposit is made by a person other than the buyer, you must inquire about the relationship and document the explanation. Deposits should be reconciled against the terms of the contract of sale.

Settlement Funds

At settlement, large sums pass through or are directed by real estate agents. You should monitor settlement fund flows for inconsistencies, including:

• Settlement funds arriving from a different source than the buyer or the buyer's known financier
• Last-minute changes to settlement arrangements, such as a request to direct proceeds to a different bank account than originally nominated
• Requests to split settlement proceeds across multiple accounts or jurisdictions without clear explanation

Detecting Unusual Patterns

Your AML/CTF program must include procedures for monitoring trust account activity for unusual or suspicious patterns. Key indicators include:

• Deposits that are inconsistent with the expected transaction amount (e.g., significantly larger or smaller than the standard 10% deposit for a residential sale)
• Multiple deposits from different sources for a single transaction
• Requests to return trust funds to a party other than the depositor
• Funds passing through the trust account with no apparent connection to a genuine property transaction
• Cash deposits, particularly those that appear structured to remain below the $10,000 Threshold Transaction Report (TTR) threshold
• Rapid turnover of funds through the trust account (funds arriving and being disbursed within a very short period)

Interaction with State Trust Account Rules

State and territory real estate legislation imposes its own trust account management requirements. For example, the Property and Stock Agents Act 2002 (NSW) and the Estate Agents Act 1980 (Vic) each prescribe detailed rules for the management of real estate trust accounts. AML/CTF trust account monitoring obligations operate in addition to these existing state requirements — they do not replace them. You must comply with both regimes simultaneously. In practice, agents should integrate AML/CTF monitoring into their existing trust account management workflows rather than creating an entirely separate process.

Cash Payment Thresholds

Under the AML/CTF Act, cash transactions of $10,000 or more trigger a Threshold Transaction Report (TTR) obligation. This applies to cash received into your trust account. Agents must also be alert to structuring — where a client deliberately breaks a cash payment into multiple amounts below $10,000 to avoid the TTR threshold. Structuring is itself an offence under the Act. If you suspect structuring, you must file a Suspicious Matter Report (SMR) in addition to any applicable TTR.

8. Suspicious Matter Reporting in Real Estate

Sections 41 to 49 of the AML/CTF Act 2006 establish the regime for Suspicious Matter Reports (SMRs). As a reporting entity, you are required to lodge an SMR with AUSTRAC whenever you form a suspicion (on reasonable grounds) that a transaction, client, or matter may be related to money laundering, terrorism financing, or any other serious offence. For comprehensive guidance on the SMR process, see our Suspicious Matter Reporting Guide.

Red Flags Specific to Property Transactions

In a real estate context, the following indicators should prompt further inquiry and may give rise to a reportable suspicion:

• A client who is unwilling or unable to provide adequate identification, or who provides identification that appears inconsistent or potentially fraudulent
• Price discrepancies — the agreed price is significantly above or below comparable market values with no credible explanation
• Cash deposits — large cash payments toward a deposit or purchase price, or multiple smaller cash deposits that appear designed to stay below reporting thresholds
• Reluctant or evasive clients — a client who avoids providing information about their identity, source of funds, or the purpose of the transaction
• Rapid resale — a property being resold within a very short period of acquisition with a significant price increase and no evident improvement
• Third-party payments — deposits or purchase funds coming from persons or entities that are not a party to the transaction and have no explained relationship to the buyer
• A client who appears to be acting on behalf of an undisclosed third party
• No commercial rationale — a client who shows no concern about the commercial terms of the transaction (e.g., willing to pay well above market value, or indifferent to the property's condition or location)
• Significant and unexplained changes to the transaction (e.g., a sudden change of purchasing entity close to settlement, or a last-minute request to redirect settlement proceeds)
• The client has known associations with criminal activity or appears on sanctions lists
• Requests to disburse trust funds in unusual ways (e.g., to overseas accounts, in cash, or to unrelated parties)

How to File an SMR

SMRs are lodged with AUSTRAC through AUSTRAC Online. Your AML/CTF program should include an internal escalation procedure so that front-line agents know how to escalate a concern to the compliance officer, who then decides whether an SMR is warranted. The compliance officer (or their delegate) is responsible for the final decision to file.

Timeframes

Once a suspicion is formed, you must lodge an SMR within the following timeframes:

• Within 24 hours if the suspicion relates to terrorism financing
• Within 3 business days for all other suspicious matters

You are not required to have proof of criminal activity. The threshold is a suspicion on reasonable grounds. If in doubt, it is generally better to file an SMR than to not file one. The AML/CTF Act provides legal protection for good-faith SMR filings — you cannot be held liable for filing a report that turns out to be unfounded, provided it was made in good faith.

Tipping-Off Prohibition

Section s123 of the AML/CTF Act makes it a criminal offence to disclose ("tip off") a person that an SMR has been, is being, or will be filed in relation to them. This prohibition carries serious penalties, including imprisonment for up to 2 years. You cannot inform the client, the other party to the transaction, their solicitors, or any other person. Frame any additional information requests or delays as routine compliance checks rather than indicating suspicion. Restrict knowledge of SMR filings within your agency to the compliance officer and senior management on a need-to-know basis.

9. Risk Assessment for Real Estate

Your AML/CTF program must be underpinned by a documented ML/TF risk assessment. This is often referred to as an enterprise-wide risk assessment (EWRA). The risk assessment should evaluate risk across five key dimensions relevant to real estate agencies:

Client Risk Factors

Different client types carry different levels of ML/TF risk. Your risk assessment should distinguish between:

• Individual domestic buyers/sellers — Generally lower risk, but consider source of wealth, occupation, and whether the individual is a PEP
• Companies and trusts — Risk varies by ownership structure, transparency, and whether beneficial ownership can be readily established. Shell companies, companies with nominee directors, and discretionary trusts with opaque beneficiary classes carry higher risk
• Foreign persons and entities — Inherently higher risk due to cross-border verification challenges
• Politically exposed persons — Elevated risk due to potential exposure to corruption
• First-time buyers vs. serial purchasers — A serial purchaser with a pattern of rapid acquisitions and disposals may warrant closer scrutiny

Property Type Risk

The type of property involved in a transaction affects the risk profile:

• High-value residential property — Luxury properties and prestige markets are attractive to money launderers because they absorb large sums in a single transaction
• Off-the-plan purchases — Allow a buyer to commit to a property with a relatively small initial deposit, with settlement (and full payment) deferred
• Commercial and industrial property — Can involve complex ownership structures and larger transaction values
• Rural and agricultural property — May involve cash-intensive businesses (e.g., farming operations) and can be more difficult to value accurately
• Development sites — Can involve speculative purchases and sales with significant price volatility, creating opportunities for price manipulation

Geographic Risk

Geographic risk has two dimensions for real estate agents:

• Property location — Certain areas may be identified as higher risk for property-based money laundering. Capital city prestige suburbs, areas with high volumes of foreign investment, and areas experiencing rapid price growth may attract more sophisticated laundering activity
• Client geographic origin — The jurisdictions in which your clients are based or from which funds are sourced. Countries on the FATF grey list, countries subject to sanctions, and jurisdictions with weak AML/CTF frameworks carry higher risk

Transaction Risk

Evaluate the risk associated with different transaction types:

• Cash transactions carry the highest risk
• Transactions with unusually short settlement periods
• Transactions where the purchase price is materially different from market value
• Off-market transactions (not publicly listed for sale)
• Transactions involving multiple related parties

Delivery Channel Risk

How you interact with clients affects ML/TF risk:

• Non-face-to-face transactions — Clients you have never met in person (e.g., interstate or overseas buyers purchasing remotely) carry higher risk due to the increased difficulty of verifying identity
• Transactions through intermediaries — Where a buyer's agent, migration agent, or other intermediary is managing the transaction on behalf of the client, you have less direct contact with the beneficial purchaser
• Online platforms — Digital channels for property transactions increase convenience but may increase identity fraud risk

Document your risk assessment findings in writing, assign risk ratings (low, medium, high, and extreme) to each category, and use the results to calibrate the intensity of your CDD and monitoring procedures. Review the risk assessment at least annually and update it whenever there is a material change to your business or the external environment.

10. Record Keeping for Real Estate Agents

Part 10 of the AML/CTF Act 2006 requires reporting entities to retain records for a minimum of 7 years from the date the record is made, or from the date the business relationship with the client ends, whichever is later.

What to Keep

For real estate agents, the records you must retain include:

• CDD records — All identification documents collected, verification results (including DVS or eIDV records), beneficial ownership assessments, and any notes relating to the CDD process for each client
• Transaction records — Records of each designated service provided, including listing agreements, contracts of sale, auction records, trust account statements, settlement documents, and property management agreements
• SMR records — Copies of all Suspicious Matter Reports filed with AUSTRAC, including the supporting analysis and the internal escalation trail
• TTR records — Records of any Threshold Transaction Reports filed
• AML/CTF program records — All versions of your AML/CTF program, risk assessments, review reports, and evidence of program updates
• Training records — Evidence that each employee has completed AML/CTF training, including dates, content covered, attendance records, and completion acknowledgements
• Correspondence with AUSTRAC — All communications with the regulator, including responses to requests for information

Practical Storage

Records may be kept in electronic form, provided they are readily accessible and can be produced to AUSTRAC upon request. Your record-keeping systems should include:

• Appropriate access controls (restricting access to CDD and SMR records to authorised personnel)
• Backup and disaster recovery procedures
• A records retention schedule that tracks retention periods and flags records approaching the end of their 7-year obligation
• Encryption for sensitive client identification data

Note that some records may need to be retained for longer than 7 years if they are subject to other regulatory requirements, such as state trust account record retention rules. Always apply the longest applicable retention period.

11. Practical Implementation Checklist

The following checklist provides a step-by-step action plan for real estate agencies preparing for AML/CTF compliance under Tranche 2. Items are presented in recommended order of priority:

How ComplyAU Assists Real Estate Agencies

Building and maintaining an AML/CTF program from scratch is a significant undertaking for any real estate agency. ComplyAU is designed to reduce the administrative burden and assist agencies in managing their compliance obligations efficiently.

ComplyAU assists real estate agencies by providing:

• AI-generated AML/CTF programs tailored to real estate — Generate a Part A and Part B program based on your agency's specific risk profile, client base, property types, and operating model
• Guided CDD and ECDD workflows — Step-by-step client onboarding workflows with identity verification, beneficial ownership identification, PEP and sanctions screening, and risk scoring
• SMR and TTR filing assistance — Structured forms and guidance to help you prepare and lodge reports with AUSTRAC within prescribed timeframes
• Trust account monitoring tools — Alerts for unusual trust account activity patterns that may warrant further investigation
• Staff training modules — Real-estate-specific AML/CTF training with completion tracking, certification records, and annual refresher scheduling
• Risk assessment frameworks — Client-level and enterprise-level ML/TF risk assessments with automated scoring calibrated for real estate
• 7-year encrypted record keeping — Immutable audit logs and secure document storage that assists with compliance obligations under Part 10

To learn more, visit the real estate agents page or join the waitlist for early access.